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Abstract 
Energy audit is the main approach to improve energy management and excavate energy conservation potential for 
Chinese enterprises.  This paper uses game theory analysis tools to establish a government, energy auditors and 
audited the tripartite game model. By analysis of three strategies and payoff functions, it draws the conclusions about 
the game equilibrium solution. On the basis, propose the control countermeasures with respect to the problem of 
corruption and reduce the losses caused by uncertain information. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Tripartite game theory summary 
Research of tripartite game theory has made progress in many aspects. Game model mostly is used in 
government’s local organizations and enterprises in the conspiracy. Since the reform and opening up, 
government regulation reform has always been a major focus of economic structural reform. Regulation 
of the Three Subject, central regulatory agencies, local regulatory agencies and to be regulated, their 
business relationship directly affect the effect of regulation can be achieved. Liu Yan used princip les of 
game theory build ing a game theory model to analysis the strategy choice in the process of government 
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regulation among the three, solved the model, and then got the results obtained from the practical 
guidance [1]. Cheng Ping  [2],Yang Jianrong [3] built an  incomplete information  dynamic game model of 
the government, real estate business and consumers with tripartite supply and demand levels , raised the 
inherent reasons of structural imbalances in the real estate market and clarified the policy factor is 
determining the basic d irect ion of China's real estate market. In  the capital markets audit areas, Zhu 
Jianhong [4] structured a game model of listed companies, accounting firms and regulatory authorities. It 
proposed incentives as a regulatory means of supervisory is more effective than punishment resulting in 
listed companies and accounting firms to grow. Wang Xingyu [5], Cang Ping [6], Yang Muzhe [7] used 
game theory as an analytical tool to research the tripart ite co-operation and non-cooperative game of 
principal, agent and rent-seeking. In the rational economic and risk neutral assumptions, they established 
a tripart ite game model, solved the Nash equilibrium, gave the policy implications of variable pa rameters, 
and then found the rent-seeking corruption countermeasures. 
1.2. Current situation of enterprise energy audit 
Chinese energy consumption growth rate has almost been 10% since 2000, which is twice as much as 
the one in 1990. Total energy consumption increases to nearly 29 million tons in 2008, which is 1.4 
billion in 2000. Energy consumption in recent 10 years rises more rapid ly than the sum of over the past 
20 years. The evaluation and management of energy conservation is imperative. Therefore, the Energy 
audit is a national advocacy and effective method to promote our energy reduction plan in  important ways.  
The energy audit helps the rational use of energy resources, improves energy efficiency and achieves 
economic and social sustainable development. At present, the promotion  of energy audits policy 
continues to improve is embodied in the following points: Government implements subsidies and 
incentives for energy audit making further improvement on implementation of energy audit ; Some areas 
have established energy utilization database in parts of the key energy companies to keep abreast 
of energy saving in all levels of government to formulate policies and measures  targeted to provide a 
scientific basis. 
2. Tripartite game model 
There are still prob lems of energy audit currently, as the relevant laws and regulations are not perfect 
and some auditors do not tend to the normal value. Th is leads to acts of corruption in energy audit and 
other non-formal operations and disrupts the healthy development of enterprise energy auditing, resulting 
in the loss to the country. Therefore, how to regulate the behaviour of the part ies involved through the 
system really  playing the role of energy audits  is an u rgent need to address the issue. In this paper, it tries 
a tripart ite game model of energy audit agency, energy audited enterprise and the government, analyses 
corruption problem in energy audit and proposes the control countermeasures  
2.1. Model hypothesizes and established 
Currently, China's total compensation of energy audit is closely related to the value of the audit ob ject, 
which will cause the pursuit of the largest auditing amount by energy audit service agencies . Audited 
enterprises for their own interests, may offer a bribe to energy audit service agencies . Audit agencies may 
concoct audit data, both sides has extra income in this way. If the government investigate, the parties 
would be subject to the risk of financial penalties. Audit agencies and audited enterprises ’ interest are 
consistent, as long as both sides  are profitable, the audit agency compliance and audited corporate bribery 
will appear.Therefore, Energy audit agency, energy audited enterprise and the government supervi-
Liu Xuezhi and Cui Ying / Energy Procedia 5 (2011) 1893–1897 1895
sion constitutes a game model. The distribution of interests between them may solve through the 
bargaining model or defau lt. In order to maintain our healthy development of energy audit and the 
effective use of state-owned assets, government departments would severely punish the two sides  on the 
irregularities activities in the audit. 
Step 1: define parameters and analyze countermeasure set of all parties’ 
Audited enterprise. Its countermeasure collection for energy evaluation is by providing false energy 
data and bribing to auditing institutions. When audited enterprise quotes according to the actual data, it 
works normally. Hypothesis is that the illegal profits audit of enterprise by providing false energy data is 
s; the bribery of auditing agency is t. Energy audit agency. Its countermeasure set is to accept bribes, 
illegal operations and work properly. Government. Its countermeasure set is to supervise or not. When it 
supervises, there are successful and unsuccessful results. Assuming the supervisory cost for c, if the 
government discovers the energy audit agency and audited enterprise with corruption, it will penalize  the 
two respectively, M multiples of punishment for the auditor and N for the audited. 
Step 2: determine the three parties’ payoff function respectively under the condition of the 
countermeasure set combination. 
(1) Energy audit agency and audited enterprise have irregularities  while the government supervises 
successfully, then the payment of A (Government), B (energy audit agency) and C (the audited enterprise) 
are:Mt+Ns-c,(1-M)t,(1-N)s-t;If the government supervises  unsuccessfully, it has a loss of monitoring 
costs and profit as much as energy audit agency gets in cheating. The payment of A, B and C are:-s-c,t,s-t; 
(2) Bribery of energy auditor and audited enterprise occurs  but the government does not monitor. The 
payment of A, B and C are:-s,t,s-t; 
(3) Energy  audit agency and audited enterprise work normally while the government supervises 
successfully or not. The payment of A, B and C are:-c,0,0; 
(4) Energy audit agency and audited enterprise have no corruption but the government does not 
monitor. The payment of A, B and C are:0,0,0; 
Step 3: establish a game model. 
Under the assumption that mixed  countermeasure, the probability of government oversight  is q1. The 
probability of government’s successful oversight is q11. The probability of bribery of energy auditor and 
audited enterprise is q2. Base on the above analysis and assumptions , reaching the following game model 
as Table 1: 
Table 1 Game model  
  
  
  
Government(A) 
Supervision  q1 No supervision 1- q1 
Successful q11 Unsuccessful 1- q11 
 
Energy audit 
agency (B)and 
audited 
enterprise(C) 
Irregularities 
q2 
A  Mt+Ns-c  -s-c  -s 
B  (1-M)t  t  t 
C  (1-N)s-t  s-t  s-t 
normal work 
1- q2 
A  -c  -c  0 
B  0  0  0 
C  0  0  0 
2.2. Solving the model 
1896  Liu Xuezhi and Cui Ying / Energy Procedia 5 (2011) 1893–1897
(1) The probability of bribery of energy auditor and audited enterprise is q2. Expected return of the government’s successful 
supervising is V1, and unsuccessful is V2. 
V1= q2·[q11·(Mt+Ns-c)+(1- q11)·(-s-c)]+(1- q2)·[q11·(-c)+(1- q11)·(-c)].            V2= q2·(-s)+(1- q2)·0. 
When the expected returns of the government’s supervision or not are  the same, we get the optimal 
probability of bribery of energy auditor and audited enterprise in the game equilibrium. 
Make V1 = V2, it is concluded that:    q2*=c/ q11·(Mt+Ns+s). 
(2)When the probability of the government supervision is q1, expected returns of bribery of energy 
auditor and audited are V3 and their normal work is V4.    V3= q1 [q11·(1-M)t+(1- q11)t]+(1- q1)t, V4=0. 
If there is no difference in the expected returns of bribery of energy auditor and audited and working 
normally, we get the optimal probability of the government supervision in the game equilibrium. 
Make V3= V4, it  is concluded that:   q1*=1/ q11·M                                                                                  (1) 
(3)Under the condition of the government supervision is q1, the audited enterprise deceives and offers 
energy auditor a bribe, the expected return is V5. When it works normally, the expected return is V6. 
V5= q1{ q11·[(1- N)s-t]+(1- q11)(s-t)}+(1- q1)·(s-t), V6=0. 
If there is no difference in the expected returns of bribery of energy auditor and audited and working 
normally, we get the optimal probability of the government supervision in the game equilibrium. 
Make V5= V6, it is concluded that:     q1*=(s- t)/ q11·Ns.                                                                        (2) 
In conclusion, we have established mixed countermeasure of Nash equilibrium in the game model as: 
q2*=c/ q11·(Mt+Ns+s), q1*=1/ q11·M.               q2*=c/ q11·(Mt+Ns+s)ˈq1*=(s-t)/ q11·Ns. 
2.3. The equilibrium theory significance and the countermeasure analysis 
(1) The meaning of the equilibrium when energy audit agency and audited enterprise have bribery. 
Equilibrium model means that the audited enterprise and energy audit agency will choose conspiracy to 
illegal operations with the optimal probability q2*, making the government or property owners jeopardize 
the interests. If energy auditor tries the illegal operations in  collusion with the audited enterprise with the 
probability of q2> q2*, then the government is to supervise as the optimal choice. Otherwise, the 
government will not supervise. If energy auditor tries the illegal operations in collusion with the audited 
enterprise with the probability of q2= q2*, then the government’s optimal choice is supervision and no 
supervision in random. 
According to the optimal solution q2*, we can see the corruption between energy audit agency and 
audited enterprise depends on c, q11, M, N, t, s.  Among them, t, s are not restricted by regulations or 
government policies, as a constant, independent of the equilibrium.  The government can directly control c , 
q11, M, N, the four variables . Through changing them, the government influence probability that 
corruption activity between energy audit agency and audited enterprise occurs. By the equilibrium, we 
conclude that q2* is proportional to c, and inversely proportional to  q11, M, N, by reducing c, increase M, 
N to reduce q2*. Therefore, reduce the cost of government supervision c and increase q11, M and N, that is, 
enlarge penalties for corrupt activities  to reduce the incidence of corruption, strengthen the supervision of 
professional quality and improve the quality of supervision. 
(2) The meaning of the equilibrium probability when the government supervises. For government, a  
choice of the optimal probability with oversight depends on value tendencies and the benefit 
maximization tendentiousness in corrupt activities between energy audit agency and audited enterprise. 
When the energy audit agency gets benefit maximization, government will provide optimal probability 
q1*=1/ q11·M (1) to supervise energy auditor. If the government oversees with the probability q1> q1*, the 
best choice of the energy auditor is to work legally. Otherwise, the energy auditor will accept bribery. If 
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the government oversees with the probability q1= q1*, the best choice of the energy auditor is in random. 
From q1*=1/ q11·M (1), we can find that q1* depends on q11 and M, but q1* is irrelevant with 
government’s supervisory cost c. Thus, through increasing the probability of government’s successful 
oversight q11 and M mult iples of punishment for the auditor, we will reduce the probability of government 
supervision effectively. 
When the audited enterprise reaches the benefit maximization, government will supervise it in the 
optimal probability q1*=(s-t)/ q11·Ns (2). If the government oversees probability with q1> q1*, the audited 
enterprise will supply real data for the optimal choice. Otherwise, it will give false data to the energy 
auditor or bribe. If the government oversees with q1= q1*, the energy auditor will randomly accept the 
bribery from the audited for the optimal choice. From q1*=(s-t)/ q11·Ns (2), we can know q1* depends on 
N and q11. Because s and t are independent of the game model, they are regarded as constant. Therefore, 
the probability of government supervision can be reduced by improving the probability of government’s 
successful oversight q11 and penalty factor N.  
(3) At last, it  is needed to explain that the game analysis of this model is one-time static game. The 
punishment on energy audit agency and audited enterprise is assumed from the angle of economic 
benefits, with no relevant to personal position and honorary problem. If we consider these factors, both 
parties shall regard  the activity in corruption opportunity costs . Through settings of incentive mechanis m, 
government will reduce corruption phenomenon occurring. At the same t ime, we also do not consider the 
supervision of the corruption problem reporting from social o rdinary citizens. Taken it  into consideration, 
we can obtain improving transparency of energy auditing results from energy audit agency, encourage 
citizens to report, strengthen the public participation and reduce the auditing illegal behavior. 
3. Conclusion 
The overall development of China's energy audit is in good condition while there are corruption 
problems in  it. But through the tripart ite game model of the government, energy auditors and audited, we 
provide improved energy audit countermeasure to make the energy management system better and 
government in energy audit more successful. 
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